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Abstract
Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is the principle of inference according to which, when faced with a
set of competing hypotheses, where each hypothesis is empirically adequate for explaining the phenomena, we
should infer the truth of the hypothesis that best explains the phenomena. When our theories correctly display this
principle, we call them our ‘best’. In this paper, I examine the explanatory role of mathematics in our best scientific
theories. In particular, I will elucidate the enormous utility of mathematical structures. I argue from a reformed
indispensability argument that mathematical structures are explanatorily indispensable to our best scientific
theories. Therefore, IBE scientific realism entails mathematical realism. I develop a naturalistic, neo-Quinean
ontology, which grounds physical and mathematical entities in structures. Mathematical structures are the truthmakers for the entities of our quantificational discourse. I also develop an ‘ontic conception’ of explanation,
according to which explanations exist in the world, whether or not we discover and model them. I apply the ontic
account to mathematical structures, arguing that these structures are the explanations for particles, forces, and even
the conservation laws of physics. As such, mathematical structures provide the fundamental grounding for
ontological commitment. I conclude by reviewing the evidence from modern physics for the existence of
mathematical structures.
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To Willard van Orman Quine,
Who first warned me that Plato’s beard has become gnarled, frequently dulling the edge of
Ockham’s razor.
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Mathematics provides enormous utility to the sciences, ranging in application from
equations used in the physical sciences, such as quantum mechanics, to the use of statistics in the
life sciences, such as biology. The question is ‘what follows about the ontology of mathematics
from its application to science?’ I aim to show that a substantive thesis concerning the reality of
mathematical structures does follow, provided one adopts a realist attitude toward science. As a
scientific realist, I take it that our best scientific theories are based on the principle of ‘inference
to the best explanation’ (IBE). Our ‘best scientific theories’ are ‘best’ in virtue of IBE, so their
‘success’ is gauged relative to the principle as a baseline for scientific theories.
My claim in this paper is that scientific realism entails mathematical realism. By
‘mathematical realism’, I mean that mathematical structures are among ‘what there is’ in the
universe. ‘Structures’ should not be confused with ‘entities’. The latter are simply those things
that “figure as values of the variables in our overall system of the world” in the sense of Quine:
numbers, functions, sets, etc., as well as so called ‘physical objects’: hypothetical particles, and
so on.1 These ‘values of variables’ need to be grounded in order not to be ‘abstract’. On my
account, structures do the grounding.
I employ a mathematical naturalism as my ontology of mathematics—not Quine’s
Platonist naturalism, but naturalism in terms of mathematical structures, which are not abstract
objects, but are fully grounded in the concrete, space-time universe. These structures are the
truth-makers for statements about mathematical objects, and as such, meaningful reference to
these objects is made possible.2 My naturalistic approach is motivated by the ontological
1

I use ‘entity’ interchangeably with ‘object’ throughout this paper.
I follow Ross Cameron (2010) in this respect, who asserts that “what there really is is what grounds the true
sentences describing the world: that is, the real existents are the truthmakers for the true sentences of English. So
the ontologist’s concern should be: what must the quantificational structure of the world be like to ground the
true English claims we make?” My answer is that the quantificational structure is mathematical.
2
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implications of modern physics, which suggest an ontology of structures, rather than objects and
their properties. Although it remains difficult to pin down exactly what the structures are,
physicists and philosophers currently look to structures of quantum physics, such as gauge
symmetry invariants, mathematically characterized by the Casimir operators of gauge groups.
Using group structures (the Poincare group, etc.), we derive structural properties with zero-value,
like spin and charge, which are then ascribed to particles, such as the Higgs boson. The Higgs is
not defined as an individual entity, but as a member of a mathematical structure—the gauge
group of which it is a part. According to the current taxonomy of particle physics, zero-value
properties “aren’t merely absences of quantities or holes in being,” but are “considered to be as
real as non-zero value properties.”3 This, in outline, is my ontological approach.
My argument is defended according to an explanatory indispensability argument of the
following form:
1. We ought to have ontological commitment to all structures that are explanatorily
indispensable to our best scientific theories.
2. Mathematical structures are explanatorily indispensable to our best scientific theories.
Therefore,
3. We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical structures.4
A key aim in formulating the indispensability argument this way is to illustrate how the existence
of something can be demonstrated by showing how it explains a phenomenon (e.g., how the
3

Holger Lyre, “Structural Invariants, Structural Kinds, Structural Laws,” forthcoming in Probabilities, Laws, and
Structures, 3.
4
This version of the argument is Mark Colyvan’s (2001). As an entity realist, Colyvan follows Quine (1960, 1981). I
have thus revised Colyvan’s entity formulation to reflect the structural argument; I sharpen the notion of
‘indispensability’ via ‘explanatory indispensability’; and I also weaken the ‘all and only’ clause in the first premise to
‘all’, leaving open possibilities besides structures for ontological commitment regarding scientific theories. The
argument is otherwise the same.
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existence of light quanta explains the photoelectric effect, how the molecular hypothesis explains
Brownian motion, etc.); mathematical structures will be examined in this light.
Structural Grounding
Premise 2 states that mathematical structures are ‘explanatorily indispensable’ to our best
scientific theories. ‘Explanatorily indispensable’ means that without these mathematical
structures, our best scientific theories wouldn’t be our ‘best’, since they would lack the requisite
explanatory power. In this way, our best scientific theories entail mathematical structures. These
structures ground the entities of our theories, according to a set of physical dependency relations.
‘Grounding’ is thus a form of metaphysical necessitation—a relationship which indicates that
some levels of being are more fundamental than others, and as such, necessitate the less
fundamental. Hydrogen and oxygen atoms are more fundamental than H2O, insofar as H2O
couldn’t exist without them. The grounding hierarchy is itself metaphysical, but direct
dependency relations among phenomena are physical facts of nature. Like causation in the
sciences, grounding is a system that backs explanatory patterns among facts in the world.
Consider the holes in Swiss cheese. 5 The holes are directly dependent on the shape of the
cheese, in the sense that if there is no shape, there are no holes. And there is no shape if there are
no deeper, physically constitutive facts, which ground the shape in more fundamental relations.
Thus, the direct dependency of holes on shape necessitates levels of being. This is because the
holes form a pattern, which directly depends on a more fundamental level of being—the level of
shape. Grounding features thus serve as inputs to structural explanation. They tell us why

5

I thank Jonathan Schaffer (“Structural Equation Models of Grounding,” Washington University talk, March 8,
2012) for this example.
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something has properties, according to further, more fundamental facts (structural) responsible
for those properties.
In the sciences, grounding relations tell us what grounds what. In geology, microphysical
features ground volcanoes, according to features like elevation, slope and stratification. In
mathematics, structures ground objects such as numbers, according to features like ordinality,
cardinality, oddness and evenness. The natural-number system is a mathematical structure that
grounds the natural numbers. A structural relation of this system is the successor function: a
relation between non-fundamental objects—the natural numbers—and the fundamental structure
that grounds them—the natural-number system. Numbers are thus ‘placeholders’ in a
mathematical structure. They are not self-subsistent things, but are directly dependent on
structure. The structure provides the grounding relations for numbers. I claim we ought to have
ontological commitment to mathematical structure for three reasons. The first is metaphysical:
because the structure grounds the number; the second is logical: because scientific realism entails
mathematical structures, hence mathematical realism; and the third is quantum physical, which I
discuss in the following section.
Mathematical Structuralism and Ontic Structural Realism
Mathematical structuralism should be distinguished from ontic structural realism (OSR)
in the following sense. OSR was originally formulated to answer underdetermination problems
posed in quantum physics—problems like whether particles are individuals or non-individuals,
whether quantum fields are substances or properties of space-time points, etc.6 OSR is therefore
not wedded to any particular doctrine concerning mathematical structures. However, the

6

See French (2010) for an overview.
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‘eliminativist’ version of OSR gives what I take to be the most conceptually coherent answer to
the metaphysical underdetermination of physics: there are no objects at all, metaphysically
speaking; structure ‘is all there is’.7 It’s the most coherent because it seems best equipped to deal
with the original underdetermination problems OSR was enacted to solve.
I believe OSR and mathematical structural realism are nonetheless engaged in a closely
allied enterprise. In mathematics, I claim mathematical structure is ‘all there is’, in the sense that
mathematical objects do not ‘exist’ independently of the structure that grounds them. In OSR,
particles, like mathematical objects, do not ‘exist’ independently of the quantum physical
structures that ground them. Over half a century ago, Quine pointed out that particles and
mathematical objects are on equal ontological footing, but in any case, we need structures to
ground entities. I believe physics and mathematics converge here, on the point of ontology. Like
my account of explanatory indispensability, OSR looks to the best theories of modern physics to
guide ontological commitment. Current physics suggests an ontology of structures over objects.
Thus, I share with OSR the commitment to show that there are only structures.8
The Indispensability of Mathematics to Science
Following Frege’s 1898 observation that “it is applicability alone which elevates
arithmetic from a game to the rank of a science,” 9 the thought that indispensability puts
mathematics on par with science began to take hold. This motivated a realist conception of the
utility of a ‘successful’ theory that generated novel prediction, tractability, economy, etc. By
1947, Gödel was characterizing this ‘success’ in terms of set theory, noting that by ‘success’ he
7

See Ladyman and Ross (2007), p.130, for the original formulation.
If my ontology of mathematical structures is correct, there is ultimately nothing distinctively mathematical about
them, since they are simply the quantum physical structures of physics; however, since they are fully described
mathematically, there is nothing distinctively physical about them, either.
9
Gottlob Frege, Philosophical Writings (Oxford: Basil, 1960), 187.
8

9

meant “fruitfulness in consequences, in particular in ‘verifiable’ consequences,” concluding that
the axioms of set theory “would have to be accepted at least in the same sense as any wellestablished physical theory.” 10 Gödel’s point is that in virtue of set theory’s utility value, we
must treat the entities of set theory as entities of a physical theory. The entities of set theory
(axioms, definitions, etc.) are thus quantified over in any scientific theory to which they are
applied, and are accordingly ‘verified’ along with mass, electron, etc. This empirical verification
of applied mathematical entities leads to Putnam’s ‘hunch’ that mathematics is closer to an
empirical science than an a priori discipline.11
The modern incarnation of the indispensability argument is due to Quine, who held that
in our ontology, we “need to add abstract objects, if we are to accommodate science as currently
constituted,” since “things we want to say in science may compel us to admit into the range of
values of the variables of quantification not only physical objects but also classes and relations of
them.”12 This is so, Quine thinks, because mathematics “is best looked upon as an integral part of
science, on a par with the physics, economics, etc., in which mathematics is said to receive its
applications.”13 Insofar as Quine means that scientific realism entails mathematical realism, I am
in agreement; but as I argue in this paper, we need only accommodate the structures that ground
Quine’s abstract objects—numbers, sets, classes, etc. This strategy circumvents Quine’s ‘hyperPythagoreanism’ 14 by grounding objects in structures.

10

Kurt Gödel, “What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?” in Philosophy of Mathematics, eds. Paul Benacerraf and
Hilary Putnam.
11
See Putnam (1975).
12
W.V. Quine, The Ways of Paradox, 231.
13
Ibid, 231.
14
At this time (1976), Quine was holding to an ontology of pure set theory, the triumph of which “has to do with
the values of the variables of quantification, and not with what we say about them…The things that a theory
deems there to be are the values of the theory’s variables, and it is these that have been resolving themselves into

10

Psillos-Style Scientific Realism vs. Laudan’s Pessimistic Induction
I follow Psillos in taking our best science as the most reliable guide to our ontological
commitments.15 Given a ‘successful’ scientific theory, IBE needs to yield novel successful
predictions of phenomena in a sound, reliable fashion. Larry Laudan’s attack on the ‘success’ of
IBE, per his ‘pessimistic induction’, weakens the link between true theories and success, but
leaves open the possibility that a scientific theory could still be approximately true. If some of a
theory’s assertions bear an explanatory connection between empirical success and the theory’s
being right about the unobservable world, we have reason not to take Laudan’s pessimistic
induction seriously.
The Ontic Conception of Explanation
The force of the IBE argument derives from the nature of explanation. In cases of
genuine explanation, we have successfully delimited a portion of the objective structure of the
world. This is the ‘ontic conception’ of explanation, which I defend. According to this
conception, Newton’s explanation of the tides is deep and powerful because he uses the tides
themselves to explain his theory of universal gravitation. By appealing directly to tidal
acceleration, etc., the explanatory power of gravitational attraction goes up, providing deeper
evidence for its existence. Newton does not use inferences, arguments or models. This is a matter
of the direction of explanation in giving an account of how explanation works. We move from
the world toward a theory. In Newton’s theory of the tides, it is the moon’s gravitational
attraction itself that explains them.

numbers and kindred objects—ultimately into pure sets. The ontology of our system of the world reduces thus to
the ontology of set theory, but our system of the world does not reduce to set theory.” (Quine [1976], p. 503)
15
Psillos (1999).
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Turning to neuroscience, let’s consider Carl Craver’s causal-mechanical explanation of
neurotransmitter release.
The mechanism begins…when an action potential depolarizes the axon terminal and so opens voltagesensitive calcium (Ca2+) channels in the neuronal membrane. Intracellular Ca2+ concentrations rise, causing
more Ca2+ to bind to Ca2+ /Calmodulin dependent kinase. The latter phosphorylates synapsin, which frees the
transmitter-containing vesicle from the cytoskeleton. At this point, Rab3A and Rab3C target the freed vesicle
to release sites in the membrane. Then v-SNARES (such as VAMP), which are incorporated into the vesicle
membrane, bind to t-SNARES (such as syntaxin and SNAP-25), which are incorporated into the axon terminal
membrane, thereby bringing the vesicle and the membrane next to one another. Finally, local influx of Ca2+ at
the active zone in the terminal leads this SNARE complex, either acting alone or in concert with other
proteins, to open a fusion pore that spans the membrane to the synaptic cleft. 16

Craver appeals directly to the mechanism to explain the phenomenon. This is because the
mechanism is the explanation of neurotransmitter release. What Craver has done is correctly read
off the causal structure of the mechanism, such that we see how it works. It would be strange to
think that the entities and activities involved in this process somehow depend on an observer to
explain the mechanism; for instance, that t-SNARES are not incorporated into the axon terminal
membrane unless there is an observer present.
Furthermore, like Newton’s explanation, there are no inferences, arguments or models
involved. That’s because none of these qualify as genuine explanations. An inference like ‘the
salt dissolved because it was placed in water’ is merely an inference with little explanatory value.
An argument like ‘all gases expand when heated; x is a gas; so, x will expand when heated’
merely states a law-like regularity with a particular instance subsumed under it, and concludes
with a future prediction. A model like Hodgkin and Huxley’s action potential, while historically
important for neuroscience, is not genuinely explanatory. Hodgkin and Huxley are themselves
clear on this point, noting that the agreement between their model and the voltage-clamp data
must not be taken as evidence that our equations are anything more than an empirical description (my italics)
of the time-course of the changes in permeability to sodium and potassium. An equally satisfactory
description of the voltage-clamp data could no doubt have been achieved with equations of very different
16

Carl Craver, Explaining the Brain (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 5.
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form, which would probably have been equally successful in predicting (my italics) the electrical behavior of
the membrane.17

Explanations must do more than describe and predict phenomena, in order to count as
explanations. They don’t merely answer a why-question; they actually tell us why.18 In this way,
explanations yield objective features, while phenomenological models yield only empirical
adequacy. If we want to get the phenomena right, and not merely save them,19 we have to
understand that mechanisms and mathematical structures are themselves the explanations, and
that models of these explanations are pragmatic approximations, at best. Hodgkin and Huxley
save the phenomena of the action potential with mathematical modeling, but leave the
explanations of the underlying mechanisms for future generations.
The world is composed of explanatory information. For Wes Salmon, this information is
Mark transmission: self-propagating causal processes with certain structural frequencies that
persist beyond the point of intervention. This account follows the ontic conception, initially
developed by Alberto Coffa, and later defended by Salmon. 20 The central idea is that in stating
‘the moon’s gravitational attraction explains the tides’, we assert that gravitational attraction is
“out there in the physical world,” understanding that these objective features “are neither
linguistic entities (sentences) nor abstract entities (propositions).” 21
Although the causal-mechanical approach nicely elicits the ontic conception of
explanation, explanation need not be causal-mechanical. While this kind of explanation can
fruitfully be applied to biology and chemistry, matters are quite different in physics. That’s

17

A.L. Hodgkin and A.F. Huxley, “A Quantitative Description of Membrane Current and its Application to
Conduction and Excitation in Nerve,” Journal of Physiology 117 (1952), 541.
18
See Salmon (1978) for the fully developed account.
19
See Van Fraassen (1980).
20
See Coffa’s dissertation (1973) for the original proposal of the ontic conception of explanation.
21
Wesley Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1989), 86.
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because unlike ‘bottom-up’ causal-mechanical explanations, which explain general regularities
like Boyle’s law with the kinetic-molecular theory of gases, explanations in physics are often
‘top-down’. These explanations appeal to something very general, like energy conservation, to
explain a range of interactions among various phenomena, thus unifying them, rather than
explaining them in terms of causes. Some thirty-five years ago, Mark Steiner pointed out that
we do not learn about the neutrino by transmission of energy from the neutrino to us—the neutrino is very
difficult to detect by direct interaction. Indeed, as far as is known, beta decay is noncausal—no anterior
event causes the breakup of the unstable lithium 6 nucleus. Nor does the neutrino participate in any event
which causes the other particles’ motion—through which we infer the existence of the neutrino. Beta decay
‘just happens’ in accordance with the law of conservation of momentum, enabling us to infer a new
particle. Laws of conservation are simply not causal laws. They provide constraints on what is allowed to
happen (my italics).22

The idea is that the constraints of conservation laws are not causes, but are nevertheless
genuinely explanatory in many cases. This is because of their power to constrain fundamental
forces. When electric and gravitational forces both conserve energy, it can’t be that these force
laws explain why energy is conserved; the common explanation must be found in the law of
energy conservation itself. On my account, mathematical structures are very closely akin to
conservation laws, in the following sense. Conservation laws are entailed by invariance
principles, and these principles play a central role in space-time symmetries, such as global
gauge symmetries (‘global’ = depends on constant parameters). In fact, Emmy Noether’s first
theorem23 states that ‘for every continuous global symmetry there exists a conservation law’. If
these invariance principles turn out to be mathematical structures, it follows that conservation
laws are entailed by mathematical structures, insofar as such laws are explained in terms of
structures.

22
23

Mark Steiner, “Mathematics, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge,” Nous 12 (1978), 22.
See Tavel (1971) for the English translation of this important 1918 work.
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Graham Nerlich’s ‘geometric style of explanation’ uses the curvature and variable
curvature of space-time as explanatory constraints, rather than causes. 24 On his account, material
particles causally interact, but their interactions are limited to select paths, directions and
distances brought about by the geometric constraints of space-time. Thus, the mathematical
structure of space-time is capable of explaining the behavior of matter without causing it. He
notes that General Relativity
provides a very strong example of geometric explanation since not only is spacetime curvature the
fundamental explanatory concept of the theory, but the idea of spacetime geometry is actually used to
reduce causal explanation by gravitational force in space during time. If spacetime is flat (i.e. Minkowskian
or pseudo-Euclidean) then a geodesic or linear path in spacetime projects onto a motion, uniform in time,
along a geodesic or linear path in space.

Nerlich holds that in many cases, the geometry of space-time does the explaining, not
causes within it. Acceptance of his argument depends in part on one’s view of what space-time
is, and what it’s capable of on its own.
The point has been to respond to the causal-mechanical approach to explanation, which
works well in some sciences, but not in physics. I agree with Salmon’s estimate of top-down and
bottom-up explanations: each offers explanatory virtues. The ontic conception of explanation
applies to both, bringing us back to the IBE argument for scientific realism. The whole point of
‘inference-to-the-best-explanation’ is that in making such inferences, we are approximating the
way things stand in the world through explanation. By appealing directly to a mechanism or
mathematical structure, rather than an argument or model, we recognize that explanations are
part of the structure of the world. When we correctly read off the explanation, we call it our
‘best’.

24

Graham Nerlich, “What Can Geometry Explain?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 30 (1979), 80.
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Truth, Objectivity and Explanation
This accords with Whewell’s ‘coherence theory of truth’, which posits that as a
successful theory develops, it tends to explain an increasing range of empirical phenomena, due
to a natural core of principles in the theory. The principles will depend on the kind of science
we’re working with. It seems to me that truth cannot be divorced from explanation in any nontrivial sense. This is because on my view, explanation does not equate to empirical adequacy,
since empirical adequacy yields only description and prediction. So, if truth cannot be divorced
from explanation, and a theory’s success is gauged relative to its explanatory power, then a
theory will be successful to the extent that it approximates truth. We gauge this extent by the
depth and range of phenomena explained by the theory.
I follow Armstrong in his conjecture that the explanatory power of mathematics is the
key justifying principle for why mathematics is indispensable to our ‘best theories’, and hence to
the IBE form of scientific realism. 25 This leaves open the possibility that our ‘best theories’ entail
mathematics as a means of describing the objective world, only. The relevant mathematics is not
itself part of the objective world. In this way, Armstrong’s account is consistent with
mathematical fictionalism, since the fictionalist can be a realist with respect to our ‘best
theories’, while denying reality to mathematics. Contrary to this position, I argue mathematical
structures are part of the objective world itself, and hence explain that world; therefore, our ‘best
scientific theories’ entail mathematical realism. Our best science, not metaphysics, is the most
reliable guide to ontological commitment. On this account, we use explanatory power to
establish existence, and thus to sanction ontological commitment.

25

Armstrong (1989) pp. 7-10.
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Ontological Commitment to ‘What there Is’: A Case Example of Mathematical Structure
Assuming one of our best scientific theories is Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity,
the question is ‘what ontological commitments does the theory involve’? We know the Lorentz
Transformations form the kinematic basis of Special Relativity. They are linear relations
between events, where we can think of an event as simply a point in space-time. The
fundamental assumption that will determine the Transformations is that space-time is
homogenous. We must also assume there are symmetries of space-time and that rotations in
space-time should be invariant.
In the most elementary sense, the assumptions boil down to an underlying notion of
symmetry: essentially a ‘form-invariance’ principle, which allows for the transformation of
variables that leaves the explicit form of the equations unchanged. Symmetry is, in this sense, a
structural preservation mechanism for the automorphism structures in which particles are
grounded. This mechanism allows us to characterize the structure of space-time, according to Lie
algebra, Riemannian geometry, etc. As a concrete space-time mechanism, symmetry yields
invariance under transformation, thus providing a powerful explanatory account of the physical
basis of automorphic structures—prime candidates for mathematical structures that ground
space-time particles.
Einstein’s theory thus involves an ontological commitment to symmetry—the space-time
mechanism which yields and preserves structure. If you’re a realist about events (space-time
points), then according to the theory’s ontological commitment, you’re a realist about the
symmetry in which those events are embedded, hence the structure that grounds the events.
Recall that the theory states that transformations of relations between these events necessarily

17

occur within the space-time symmetry. Thus, insofar as symmetries of Special Relativity are
mechanisms for preserving physical structures, the scientific theory entails ontological
commitment those structures, and hence Special Relativity entails mathematical realism.
Objection from the ‘Special Sciences’
One objection to the indispensability of mathematical structures is that examples from
physics are more transparent than other branches of science, such as the life sciences. If our ‘best
scientific theories’ come from all areas of science, not just physics, it isn’t clear how
mathematics plays a comparable explanatory role in these areas. While I agree that physics
examples are more easily produced, I disagree that mathematics can’t play a comparable
explanatory role in the life sciences. At least some theories of the life sciences achieve ‘success’
only by appeal to the explanatory power of the mathematics involved.
Take Alan Baker’s case study on North American cicadas. 26 One of the goals of the study
was to show why the life-cycle of the ‘periodical’ cicada is prime-numbered (13 and 17 years).
Of the two evolutionary explanations offered by the biologists (one involving avoidance of
predators, the other based on avoidance of hybridization with subspecies), both appeal explicitly
to number-theoretic results, involving the notion of a ‘lowest common multiple’, as well as the
intersection of prime number periods. Baker claims the explanations ineliminably involve
reference to a coprime theorem that is genuinely explanatory, when considered as essential to the
overall explanation given by the biologists. If we remove the theorem, the explanatory power of
the theory is significantly weakened.

26

Alan Baker, “Are there Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena?” Mind 114 (2005).
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From this case of genuine mathematical explanation, Baker draws the conclusion that
‘numbers exist’. Baker’s conclusion is not without its criticisms. 27 The details of the case,
concerning whether equally strong non-mathematical explanations could be given, are currently
under debate. Furthermore, I argue that Baker’s numbers must be grounded in structures. But the
example still suggests that mathematics does play a genuinely explanatory role in the life
sciences, not just in physics. The cicada case thus provides reason to take mathematical realism
seriously, according to its explanatory application in the life sciences.
The Right Kind of ‘Abstraction’: Mathematical Idealization and Explanatory Depth
Consider Batterman’s ‘asymptotic explanation’ of the rainbow.28 He starts by asking
how it is that the circumstantial details (wind, raindrop shape, etc.) of rainbows are always
unique, yet it is always the same structural pattern we witness. To explain this, we appeal to
patterns and regularities. We have to know why rainbows always appear with the same light
intensities and spacing between bows (among other things). Batterman uses the ‘asymptotic’
approach, which reveals how mathematical relations provide limiting cases for equations drawn
from two different theories: classical and quantum mechanics. This means that certain
mathematical structures shared by the two theories (bridged by semiclassical mechanics) remain
stable under perturbations, and account for the light intensities and bow spacings in the same
way.
The stability of the mathematical structures is mirrored in the rainbow, which can
undergo perturbation of shape by raindrops and other factors, according to a wave equation in the
limit, whereby the wavelength of light approaches zero. Robust and repeatable patterns emerge
27
28

See Saatsi (2007, 2011).
Robert Batterman, The Devil in the Details (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002).
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from applied mathematics, deepening our understanding of the nature of such regularities and
invariances. For Batterman, the explanatory power of the theory of geometrical optics (ray
theory) and wave theory combined allows us to discard many of the physical details of the
rainbow in favor of mathematical idealization. Using these theories together with asymptotic
reasoning, Batterman explains where the arc of a rainbow comes from, predicts where the arc
will be located, and accounts for the intensities and locations of various bows we see. He argues
that these features of rainbows can only be explained by a combination of mathematics (the
‘limiting operation’, geometry, etc.) and physical theory.
Batterman’s asymptotic reasoning distinguishes useful idealization of the rainbow from
its literally realistic features. His ‘asymptotic explanation’ of supernumerary bows combines
G.B. Airy’s integral equation with the Stokes Phenomenon. The explanation shows that the
details supposedly distinguishing one physical system from another are actually irrelevant when
we ‘abstract away’ from the systems themselves, in favor of understanding their universal
behavior in terms of the fundamental physics which grounds all physical systems. As Batterman
argues, the fundamental physics ineliminably involves accounting for the physical phenomenon
(a rainbow) at the right level of mathematical abstraction. These are cases in which the
explanatory indispensability of mathematics entails ontological commitment, given the role
played by the mathematics in the theories.
Like Batterman, Weslake’s ‘abstractive account of explanatory depth’ takes abstraction
to be a genuine dimension of explanatory power, yielding some of our ‘best explanations’ of
scientific theories.29 ‘Explanatory depth’ reveals the objective features of explanations by
showing how ‘depth’ in no way depends on models or representations. This approach to
29

Brad Weslake, “Explanatory Depth,” Philosophy of Science 77 (2010).
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explanation tracks the attitudes of scientists. As Weslake notes, “The abstractive account
provides an objective notion of explanatory virtue that justifies this claim, without requiring
recourse to subjective notions of simplicity and understandability.” 30
Mathematics is explanatorily indispensable to IBE because of its ability to unify through
generality. We often obtain deeper explanations by ‘abstracting away’ from the messy details. In
doing so, we achieve greater explanatory range. Unlike D-N (deductive-nomological) models of
scientific explanation, in which the mathematics is merely a component of the argument, the
mathematics in Weslake’s account generates “explanations that would remain explanatory even
if the fundamental laws of nature were different, within a certain set of constraints, from what
they actually are.”31 In this way, mathematical explanation applies to an impressive range of
nomologically and logically possible situations.
‘Pure’ versus ‘Applied’ Mathematics: Can Empirical Science Entail Mathematical Truth?
Christopher Pincock holds that mathematics’ contribution to scientific explanation is not
justified empirically, but only on ‘a priori’ grounds. He asserts that “mathematical claims can
only contribute to explanations if the mathematical claims are independently supported by purely
mathematical means,” concluding that mathematics is ‘conditionally’ indispensable to science,
insofar as “its claims receive substantial support independently of its application in science.” 32
From this it follows, for Pincock, that mathematical claims are a priori, while claims concerning
unobservables are empirical. The problem of reconciling mathematical and scientific claims is
that “the truth of many mathematical claims goes far beyond what is needed for the explanation
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to be successful.”33 Pincock’s point is that mathematical truth and empirical success are distinct
concepts. Drawing ontological conclusions from their co-occurrence in a scientific explanation is
a mistake.
I grant Pincock that the domain of pure mathematics is indeed separate from empirical
science. But this point does not threaten my overall argument. Recall that the explanatory
indispensability argument singles out applied mathematics as the driving force behind
ontological commitment. As far as I’m concerned, mathematical structures posited by pure
mathematics ‘exist’ only insofar as they receive application in the sciences. A Euclidean vector,
for example, exists insofar as it describes the velocity and acceleration of a traveling particle—
but it does not ‘exist’ a priori, as a purely mathematical posit. We cannot determine pure
mathematical truths by empirical science because such truths have intra-mathematical
explanations—explanations which in no way depend on the empirical world. Whether we can
discover such truths empirically is an interesting question, but whether we can know
mathematical truths empirically and whether mathematical truths are empirical—these are really
two different questions (outside the scope of this paper).
In Putnam’s essay ‘What is Mathematical Truth?’ he argues that mathematics is not
justified by proof/induction (i.e., by purely formal means), but by ‘success’ in physical science.
The contrast I wish to draw here is that Pincock and Putnam represent the Scylla and Charybdis
of taking the whole of mathematics’ relation to the world as a disjunction—either analytic or
synthetic. Pincock tends to think of mathematics as analytic, while Putnam stresses its synthetic
character. Twentieth-century mathematics shows that neither view is strictly correct.
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Treating mathematics in its reliance on a priori justification, Pincock clarifies that in
providing an explanation, “scientists first justify the relevant mathematics by mathematical
means and then use this mathematics to explain scientific phenomena.” 34 He raises two related
points. First, scientific explanation cannot yield mathematical truth because this can only come
from within mathematics. Second, because of this, we face an underdetermination problem in
trying to use our best scientific theories to provide evidence for the truth of mathematical claims.
Given these factors, IBE scientific realism cannot entail mathematical realism, because our best
scientific theories do not entail mathematical truth.
Explanatory Indispensability over ‘Truth’: the Case for Mathematical Trivialism
It’s not immediately clear that our best scientific theories need to provide such evidence
for the truth of mathematical claims. Some portion of mathematics behind the Theory of Special
Relativity might turn out not to be justified, either due to the theory itself, or to something
internal to the mathematics—but this doesn’t mean the theory isn’t true or approximately true.
Nor does it mean mathematics is no longer explanatorily indispensable to the theory (hence
entailed by IBE). It might turn out, for example, that mathematical truths are ‘trivially true’, as
Cameron and Rayo have recently suggested.35
On this account, mathematical truths make no demands of the world that they exist. So
the truths themselves do not entail ontological commitment, and hence truth-makers are not
required for mathematical truths. Take Goldbach’s conjecture, ‘every even number greater than 2
is the sum of two primes’. Under trivialism, no truth-makers are required because nothing about
the world needs to be satisfied to make the conjecture come out ‘true’; consequently, no
34
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ontological commitment is accrued. In principle, Goldbach’s conjecture (the structural aspect)
could still be explanatorily indispensable to some of our best scientific theories. If so, we ought
to be ontologically committed to its structure, not because of its formal truth, but because of its
explanatory indispensability.
The Honeycomb Theorem
The question of how pure mathematics is justified by mathematicians is not my concern
in this paper. Once justified, pure mathematics can be applied. Take an example from Lyon and
Colyvan. Like Baker, they connect a mathematical theorem to a biological claim, yielding an
explanation. They focus on the question, ‘why does a hive-bee honeycomb have a hexagonal
structure?’ What needs to be explained is “why the honeycomb is always divided up into
hexagons and not some other polygon (such as triangles or squares).”36 Biologists make
assumptions concerning evolutionary advantage, and then build into their explanation the
hypothesis that the hexagonal grid wastes less wax than other shapes, so the bees that use the
grid are selected over bees that waste energy building less efficient combs. Then they conjoin the
biological claim to what’s called the honeycomb theorem, proved by Thomas C. Hales in 1999:
“A hexagonal grid represents the best way to divide a surface into regions of equal area with the
least total perimeter.”37
Hales’s proof explains why the hexagonal grid provides an optimal means of dividing up
a two-dimensional surface so that less wax is wasted and less energy spent. So, the evolutionary
biology, coupled with the honeycomb theorem, gives us what Lyon and Colyvan refer to as our
‘best explanation for this phenomenon’. We can only assume the geometry is justified, and that
36
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intra-mathematical problems will be worked out intra-mathematically. We then conclude that the
mathematics is explanatorily indispensable to the explanandum phenomenon, in this case, the
structure of the hive-bee honeycomb.
Ontological Commitment and IBE: The Fundamental Thesis
The explanatory power of mathematics brings us back to the notions of approximate
truth, success, and the IBE argument for the entailment of mathematical realism. Our best
scientific theories, which are true or at least approximately true, tell us that ontological
commitment to some portion of mathematics is unavoidable; without ontological commitment to
the truth of our best scientific theories, and hence without relying on these theories as a guide to
ontological commitment, the commitment to mathematical realism would be unclear; but we do
make the ontological commitment to the truth of our best scientific theories, insofar as we adopt
the IBE scientific realist stance. In this way, scientific realism entails mathematical realism.
What does this ‘portion of mathematics’ amount to? As the explanatory indispensability
argument states, ‘mathematical structures’. Arthur Eddington held that for a ‘strict expression’ of
structural knowledge, a mathematical form was essential. This is because “structural knowledge
can be detached from knowledge of the entities forming the structure,” enabling us to “introduce
spherical space in physics,” according to which “we refer to something—we know not what—
which has this structure.”38 Eddington indicates the type of structural grounding elucidated in
this paper. Structures are ontologically fundamental, so we can genuinely refer to something like
spherical space as a structure, not an object, without committing ourselves to the existence of an
object—spherical space.
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Premise 2 of my original argument states that ‘mathematical structures are explanatorily
indispensable to our best scientific theories’. Adopting Shapiro’s ‘relationalist’ notion of
mathematical ‘structure’, we could take it to be “the abstract form of a system, highlighting the
interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any features of them that do not affect how
they relate to other objects in the system.”39 The problem with this conception is that it isn’t clear
how ‘relations without relata’ makes sense. Furthermore, if by ‘abstract form’ Shapiro means
mathematical structures are not fully grounded in the concrete space-time universe, his account
falls short of my naturalistic requirement that mathematical structures must be the truth-makers
for statements about mathematical objects, rather than ‘abstract’ in the Platonist sense.
Consider the natural number 5. The Quine-Putnam indispensability argument decrees that
in ‘quantifying over’ the number 5 we are confirming its existence and thus ought to be
ontologically committed to it;40 however, on the structural account, the number 5 cannot be
explanatorily indispensable to our best scientific theories unless it is considered part of the
natural-number system, with a structural position in it. The structural component of the number 5
can be explanatorily indispensable, insofar as it is grounded in the natural-number structure.
Mathematical structuralism stems from a close attention to the current scientific climate.
In quantum physics, ‘group structure’ plays an indispensable explanatory role. These types of
structure are central to theories of gauge symmetry, invariance principles, objectivity of
structure, etc. It is far from clear, however, that quantification over a set of numbers requires
ontological commitment to each and every number of the set plus commitment to the set itself.
Abstracta such as numbers and sets violate what Ladyman and Ross call the ‘principle of
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naturalistic closure’ (PNC):41 metaphysical claims earn their keep by explanatory contribution to
a set of scientific hypotheses (at least one of which is drawn from physics), such that the
metaphysics strengthens the explanatory power of the hypotheses, when joined together. As I
have shown in this paper, mathematical structuralism accords quite well with the PNC, though
the principle is too strongly stated that one of the hypotheses must be drawn from physics.
Quantifying over ‘the set of all electrons’ does not strengthen the explanatory power of
the theory of electrons in which it appears. On the other hand, quantifying over the structural
properties of electrons does strengthen the theory’s explanatory power, provided we can ground
the properties in the appropriate physical structures. The PNC is a latter-day extension of
Quine’s own naturalistic principles, but it rules out his method of quantification, since
quantifying over abstract objects fails to strengthen explanatory power. As Steven Weinberg
points out, “mathematical structures that physicists develop in obedience to physical principles
have an odd kind of portability. They can be carried over from one conceptual environment to
another and serve many different purposes.” He concludes that these structures are often found
“to be extraordinarily valuable by the physicist.”42
The idea is that mathematical structures have a life of their own, independent of the
interests of the physicist who uses them. That mathematical structures can be ‘carried over from
one conceptual environment to another’ suggests a genuine reference to them—that their
existence persists through theory change.43 The enormous flexibility of mathematical structures,
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highlighted by Weinberg, brings us back to the utility value of mathematics and what ontological
conclusions can be drawn.
Conclusion
I conclude by recalling Eugene Wigner’s well-worn phrase concerning the ‘unreasonable
effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences’: “The miracle of the appropriateness of the
language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we
neither understand nor deserve.” 44 As I have tried to show throughout this paper, the
‘appropriateness’ is a matter of physical fact, not a ‘miracle’, since mathematical structures are
fully instantiated in the concrete space-time universe. They serve as truth-makers for
mathematical statements, and these statements render our formulations of the laws of physics
true, or at least approximately true. For these reasons, there is nothing ‘unreasonable’ about the
‘effectiveness’ of mathematics.
The insight that mathematical structures are fully ‘physical’ goes the distance in helping
us understand Wigner’s ‘gift’ of the language of mathematics. By ‘reading off’ this language
from mathematical structures, we achieve great explanatory power in our scientific theories,
particularly in quantum physics. If the principle of ‘invariance under transformations’ is
sufficiently explained by mathematical structures, we conclude, on the basis of explanatory
power, that those structures exist. Thus, they become explanatorily indispensable to our best
scientific theories.
As for explanation, I have argued for the ontic conception: explanations are full-bodied
features of the world. Mathematical structures are themselves such explanations. These
44
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structures are fundamental. They ground mathematical objects and serve as truth-makers for
statements about them. To recap, we ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical
structures for three reasons: because they ground what we posit about the world; they are
entailed by scientific realism; and because there is powerful evidence for them in quantum
physics. The idea that mathematical structures are among ‘what there is’ has become
commonplace in physics today. Max Tegmark has recently claimed that ‘reality itself is a
mathematical structure’.45 He argues for a monism about mathematical structure, according to
which
instead of having one mathematical description for this and a different one for that, we realize there’s a
single mathematical structure that encompasses all of it…it would be a natural conclusion…if there’s a
single mathematical structure that is our reality, and all the mathematical structures that we’ve discovered
before are part of this more beautiful whole.46

I adopt Batterman’s approach to explanatory contact between mathematics and natural
science, which “looks to the world as the ‘driving influence’ for how mathematics gets applied,
rather than to fortuitous parallels or analogies between mathematical structures and physical
structures.”47 Batterman concludes, against Wigner’s ‘miracle’, that “the world itself tells us that
a certain kind of mathematical language is required for genuine understanding.” 48 By
‘mathematical language’, Batterman means mathematically powerful idealizations that yield
rich, explanatory patterns among physical phenomena. Making such connections reveals that
mathematics is explanatorily indispensable to our best scientific theories, and therefore, that IBE
scientific realism entails mathematical realism (structural).
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